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NOTICE AND STANDING IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
SEARCHES OF PERSONAL DATA
Jennifer Daskal*
ABSTRACT
In at least two recent cases, courts have rejected service providers’ capacity to
raise Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of their customers. These holdings rely
on longstanding Supreme Court doctrine establishing a general rule against third
parties asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of others. However, there is a key
difference between these two recent cases and those cases on which the doctrine
rests. The relevant Supreme Court doctrine stems from situations in which someone
could take action to raise the Fourth Amendment claim, even if the particular third-
party litigant could not. In the situations presented by the recent cases, by contrast,
the service provider was the only source of possible challenge—at least for some
meaningful period of time.
In both cases, the searches were done pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance
with the Stored Communications Act (SCA). Because the government proceeded by
warrant, the government was not required to give notice to the target of the search.
The warrants were also accompanied by no-notice orders, meaning that the provider
was barred from telling anyone, including the target of the search, that his or her
data was being sought by the government—in some cases indefinitely.
The use of such no-notice warrants served on third-party providers is an increas-
ingly common investigatory tool, wrought by the changes in the way personal infor-
mation is stored and managed in the digital age. Its use presents a significant shift
in how investigations are carried out. It relies on a third-party intermediary between
the police and the citizenry to gather information about persons of interest. It makes
the searches that are occurring much more indirect and less visible. And it means
that individuals are a lot less likely to know—and thus have an opportunity to
object—if and when their personal information is being sought and collected by law
enforcement officials. This Article examines what has changed; why it matters; and
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the implications for the Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, this Article makes the case
for notice and revisions to standing doctrine as an essential to protecting Fourth
Amendment interests and as good policy.
INTRODUCTION
It used to be the case that if law enforcement sought a target’s personal commu-
nications or record of business meetings, it would have to go directly to the target.1
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical target named John. Law enforcement would,
for example, either seek the data directly from John, or it would get a warrant to
search John’s home or other property for the relevant information.2 If John was present
when the search was carried out, he would know about it.3 In fact, there would be
direct interaction between John and the officers searching his home.4 And if he was
not present, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
officers executing the search “leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place
where the officer took the property.”5 As a result, John would be on notice of the
search.6 If he thought the search was unlawful, John could raise concerns with the
relevant authorities, publicize what happened to him, or bring a formal civil action,
even if he were never actually charged with a crime.7 Additionally, if John were in
fact charged, he could bring a motion to suppress.8
Perhaps, instead of searching John’s property, the investigating officers would go
and talk to John’s friend or employer and compel that individual to turn over relevant
documents about John.9 In that case, law enforcement officials would not be obliged
1 Prior to the advent of electronic communications, wiretapping, and cell phones, all
searches were in physical space. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 See id.
3 Even in the present day, such physical searches require that “a copy of the warrant and
a receipt for property taken” be provided. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C).
4 See id.
5 Id.
6 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note to 2016 amendment (“The
[2016] amendment is intended to ensure that reasonable efforts are made to provide notice
of the search, seizure, or copying, as well as a receipt for any information that was seized or
copied, to the person whose property was searched or who possessed the information that was
seized or copied.”).
7 The civil action would be a Section 1983 claim. See generally David E. Nash, Note,
Damage Actions Under Section 1983 for Illegal Searches and Seizures: Reconsidering the Ap-
plicability of Collateral Estoppel, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1029.
8 The court may exclude evidence obtained through illegal searches. See generally William
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975
WASH. U. L.Q. 621.
9 For example, third-party consent searches allow such information to be turned over to
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to tell John about the search, but the friend or employer would be free to do so.10 And
if the search of the friend’s home or employer’s workplace was unduly invasive, the
friend or employer could challenge the legality of the search—even if under current
doctrine John could not himself bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.11
Thus, there is someone who could, at least theoretically, provide a check on gov-
ernment overreach—even in those cases where John was not ultimately charged with
a crime.12 John—or his friend or employer—could bring a civil challenge against
allegedly abusive police practices, albeit as an ex post challenge.13 Any such indi-
viduals could seek administrative redress via civilian complaint mechanisms. They
could also publicize the events, therefore providing a potential deterrent mechanism
in the form of undesirable public attention.14
These days, however, most personal information related to John is not—or is at
least not exclusively—in his home, written down in an address book or diary, or in
the possession of close friends or employers. Rather, it is digitized and increasingly
in the custody and control of third-party providers—including Internet service provid-
ers, purveyors of social media, distributors of electronic gadgets, and other corporate
entities that manage, transmit, and store his data and do not have a personal relation-
ship with John.15
Instead of searching John’s home or seeking information from his close friend
or employer, law enforcement officials go to these third-party providers to access
the data, generally pursuant to the provisions of the SCA.16 Depending on what and
how the data is being requested, the government will not be obliged to tell John that
it is searching his data.17 The government also can bar the service provider from
telling John that he has been the subject of the search through what has colloquially
been called a “gag order.”18
police. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.3 (5th ed. 2017).
10 See id.
11 Anyone with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the search has standing
to challenge the search. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
12 See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., George Leef, Will There Be Justice for Family Whose Home Was Raided Be-
cause Cops Couldn’t Tell Tea from Pot?, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2017, 7:30 PM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2017/08/01/will-there-be-justice-for-family-whose-home-was
-raided-because-cops-couldnt-tell-tea-from-pot/#3a0a8c0770e6 [http://perma.cc/96D8
-R2ZQ] (profiling Harte v. Board of Commissioners, 864 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 2017), where
a tea grower’s home was raided after being suspected of growing drugs).
15 See Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Personal Data and Privacy 3 (WPISP
-WPIE Roundtable Background Paper No. 3, 2010).
16 See infra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
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Until recently, many of these gag orders were of indefinite duration.19 As of an
October 2017 policy change, federal prosecutors may seek gag orders for a maxi-
mum of one year.20 If, however, there is a finding of exceptional circumstances,
approved by a designated supervisor, federal prosecutors can seek gag orders that
last longer than a year.21 The orders also can be renewed.22 The guidance does not
bind state prosecutors.23
The government argues that these no-notice provisions are necessary to protect
the integrity of their investigations.24 The statute itself lists a series of compelling
reasons that must be invoked to both delay governmental notice and to justify the
issuance of a gag order.25 Specifically, in order to issue either a delayed notice order
or gag order, a court must find a reason to believe that notice will result in one of the
following consequences:
(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
(B) flight from prosecution;
(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly
delaying a trial.26
On their face, each of these seem to be a legitimate reason for delaying or precluding
notice. In such situations, our hypothetical target John will not learn about the fact
that his data has been subject to a governmental search and seizure—perhaps for
good reason and perhaps for some potentially lengthy period of time.
John can’t challenge the search or seizure because he doesn’t know about it.27
And the service provider, which does know about the search or seizure, can’t raise
19 Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Moves to End Routine Gag Orders on Tech
Firms, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-se
curity/justice-department-moves-to-end-routine-gag-orders-on-tech-firms/2017/10/23
/df8300bc-b848-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.341e4db4a441 [https://
perma.cc/P45J-DAR7].
20 Memorandum from Rod. J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Heads of Dep’t Law Enf’t Components et al., Policy Regarding Applications for Pro-
tective Orders Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov
/criminal-ccips/page/file/1005791/download [https://perma.cc/5XKP-M3Y6] [hereinafter
Rosenstein Memorandum].
21 Id.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012).
26 Id. § 2705(a)(1)(B)(2).
27 See infra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
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Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of John—at least according to the government’s
and several judges’ interpretation of current doctrine.28 That means that there is no
one who is both in the position and legally entitled to challenge the search or seizure
on Fourth Amendment grounds during the period of secrecy—thus eliminating one
of the most powerful checks on government overreach.
This Article challenges this law and practice on both constitutional and policy
grounds. It proceeds in three parts. It starts by describing the relevant statutory
framework and two recent cases where the issues have been brought to the fore-
front.29 It then examines and critiques what the Supreme Court and relevant lower
courts have said about both notice and standing.30 It concludes with a policy argu-
ment for a statutory change to require governmental notice in the issuance of SCA
warrants, preclude indefinite gag orders (thus codifying what the federal government
already has done as a matter of policy), and enable providers to bring Fourth
Amendment claims on behalf of their customers.31
I. NOTICE AND STANDING: THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND
TWO RECENT COURT CASES
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The SCA sets up a complicated statutory scheme governing, among other things,
when and how law enforcement can compel a provider of wire or electronic communi-
cations services (what I label the “service provider”) to produce stored data.32 Certain
kinds of information can be obtained by subpoena.33 Other kinds of information can be
obtained by court order based on “reasonable grounds to believe” that the sought after
data “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”34 And, pursuant
to the widespread application and interpretation of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in United
States v. Warshak,35 communications content can only be obtained by warrant.36
28 See infra Part I.
29 See infra Part I.
30 See infra Part II.
31 See infra Part III.
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). The SCA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2727 (2012).
33 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i) (permitting a government entity to compel a provider to
disclose the contents of electronic communications through an administrative subpoena).
34 Id. § 2703(d).
35 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f government agents compel an ISP to surrender
the contents of a subscriber’s emails, [this action] necessitates compliance with the warrant
requirement . . . .”).
36 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (laying out the statutory framework). The statute itself
specifies that if the government is seeking to compel communications content from a so-
called “remote computing service” or communications in storage for more than 180 days,
then the government can proceed by court order or subpoena, rather than by warrant. Id.
§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). However, in such cases, it must give notice to the target. Id.
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When the government uses a warrant to compel production of sought-after data, it
need not provide notice to the target.37
The embrace of an indefinite no-notice warrant contrasts to other analogous
statutory provisions authorizing law enforcement collection of communications
content, which permit a time-limited delay in government-required notifications.38
Sneak-and-peak warrants, for example, permit the government to engage in covert
searches—but only for a limited period of time.39 At the end of 30 days, the govern-
ment is required to give notice, absent another time-limited extension.40 The Wiretap
Act41 similarly specifies that the target of an intercept order must be provided with
relevant information about the wiretap within 90 days of the application for such an
order—although it too allows for such notice to be postponed based on a “showing
of good cause.”42 Other provisions permit no notice production of non-content
information from third-party providers. But they are all arguably justified on the
grounds that, under current doctrine, there is no Fourth Amendment interest in the
kinds of non-content information that is being accessed.43 By contrast, the statutory
§ 2703(b)(1)(B). Currently, however, both the Department of Justice and all major service
providers are treating Warshak as if it has nationwide application and demanding a warrant
as grounds for compelling communications content, regardless of how long it has been in
storage. Hanni Fakhoury, Will Telcos Follow ISPs and Extend Warrant Protection for All?,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 17, 2014), https://eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/will-tel
cos-follow-isps-and-require-warrant-cell [https://perma.cc/TUA4-GQKB] (“Although Warshak
only controlled in the Sixth Circuit, many of the largest online service providers including
Facebook, Google, Apple, Microsoft and Yahoo made Warshak the rule across the board,
and began demanding all law enforcement across the country use a warrant to obtain the con-
tents of electronic communications. As that became the internal policy for the companies,
eventually even the Department of Justice followed, ordering federal prosecutors and law
enforcement agents nationwide to use a warrant to obtain emails.”).
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
38 Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012).
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (2012).
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(c) (specifying that “each additional delay should be limited to
periods of 90 days or less, unless the facts of the case justify a longer period of delay”—
nothing in this provision allows for indefinite delay); see also, e.g., United States v. Freitas, 800
F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he warrant was constitutionally defective in failing to
provide explicitly for notice within a reasonable, but short, time subsequent to the surreptitious
entry. Such time should not exceed seven days except upon a strong showing of necessity.”).
41 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2525 (2012). This Chapter is fully entitled “Wire and Electronic
Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications.”
42 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
43 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012) (section entitled “[g]eneral prohibition on pen register
and trap and trace device use; exception”); 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012) (section entitled “[c]ounter-
intelligence access to telephone toll and transactional records”). Under current doctrine, the
absence of any notice requirement can arguably be justified on the grounds that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the kind of non-content data obtained via these pro-
visions, and thus the collection does not trigger the Fourth Amendment. See generally Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). By comparison the kind of data collected by a SCA
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framework governing wiretaps is premised on the idea that while notice of a govern-
mental search of content can be delayed, it cannot be indefinitely postponed without
running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.44
A separate provision under the SCA also authorizes a court, upon motion of the
government, to preclude the service provider from disclosing the existence of a com-
pelled production order—the so-called “gag order” provision.45 As described above,
the court must determine that there is a “reason to believe” that notification will
endanger an individual; lead to a “flight from prosecution,” destruction of evidence,
or intimidation of a witness; or otherwise jeopardize an investigation in order to
issue a gag order.46 The statute does not include a time limit as to how long such
orders can last—instead specifying that they should be issues “for such period as the
court deems appropriate.”47 Although the reference to a “period of time” suggests
that these orders ought to have some limit, the government has been seeking—and
courts issuing—gag orders of indefinite duration.48 An October 2017 Department of
Justice policy change arguably puts an end to this practice on the federal level—
directing prosecutors to, as a default, seek gag orders of no more than a year.49 But
this policy change does not bind state prosecutors.50
The issuance of indefinite gag orders is hard to justify (hence the Department of
Justice policy change).51 Whereas there are often sound reasons why secrecy is needed
in order to preserve the integrity of an investigation,52 at some point the investigation
is completed. Yet, indefinite gag orders mean that providers may be subject to these se-
crecy provisions even after the underlying justification for the orders no longer exist.53
warrant is, pursuant to Warshak, generally understood as falling within the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
44 See, e.g., Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456 (holding that the “warrant was constitutionally
defective in failing to provide explicitly for notice within a reasonable, but short, time
subsequent to the surreptitious entry”).
45 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012). The so-called “gag order” provision is actually entitled
“Preclusion of Notice to Subject of Governmental Access.” Id.
46 See id. Microsoft separately contends that “reason to believe” is too lax a standard, al-
though does not specify what standard of proof should be required. Microsoft’s Opposition
to Government’s Motion to Dismiss at 14–16, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233
F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR) [hereinafter Microsoft’s Op-
position]; First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at para. 29, Microsoft, 233
F. Supp. 3d 887 (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint]. It argues
that courts have been issuing gag order rulings based on boiler plate language without suf-
ficient consideration of the particular facts that would justify one of the relevant findings.
Microsoft’s Opposition, supra, at 14–15.
47 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).
48 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at paras. 5, 16.
49 See Rosenstein Memorandum, supra note 20.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).
53 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at paras. 5, 16.
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Of particular concern, the combination of these secrecy provisions and restric-
tive third party standing doctrine means that there is no one in the position to raise
a Fourth Amendment challenge to the legality of the search or seizure.54 To be sure,
the SCA authorizes a service provider to bring a motion to quash “if the information
or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such
order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.”55 But at least one
court has concluded that this grant of authority is limited to the issuance of court
orders that are not warrants.56 Pursuant to this interpretation, there is no means for
the provider to challenge a warrant.57 There is also disagreement as to what “undue
burden” refers to: whether it refers exclusively to the time and cost of executing a
search, or whether it also permits broader challenges based on a provider’s business
interests in maintaining its customers’ trust.58
In addition, the SCA’s statutory authorization to challenge a search stands in
contrast to the more open-ended authority granted to providers to challenge direc-
tives issued pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act.59 As a result, some have con-
cluded that providers lack any basis for bringing Fourth Amendment claims on
behalf of their customers—even if their customers are kept in the dark about the
relevant search or seizure that the provider seeks to challenge.60
1. The Microsoft Litigation
In 2016, Microsoft brought both a facial and as applied challenge to the “gag order”
provision of SCA.61 Microsoft asserted that it had been issued more than 3,200
secrecy orders in the 20-month period ending in May 2016, and that nearly two-thirds
were for an indefinite length of time.62 Some 650 of those were issued in conjunction
54 See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text; infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
55 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
56 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 29 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015).
57 See id. at 31.
58 See, e.g., In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141, 153
(N.Y. 2017) (Rivera, J., concurring) (expressing the view that the statute’s reference to “undue
burden” covers demands for information that would adversely impact a provider’s business,
reputational, and property interests).
59 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) (2012) (authorizing providers to “petition to modify or
set aside such directive with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court”); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)
(section entitled “[j]udicial review of FISA orders”); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (find-
ing that language included in the Protect America Act—which specified that providers could
challenge “the legality of [a] directive”—gave providers third-party standing to raise the Fourth
Amendment claims on behalf of their customers). The authorization under the SCA, by com-
parison, focuses particularly on the volume and burden of the request. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
60 See In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 14 N.Y.S.3d at 29.
61 First Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at paras. 27, 32.
62 Id. at para. 16.
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with a search warrant; therefore the government had no obligation to disclose the fact
of the search to the target and Microsoft was indefinitely barred from doing so.63
Amicus filings in the case indicate that Microsoft was hardly an outlier. During
the first seven months of 2016, Yahoo “received over 700 federal search warrants
for user data, and well over half—about 60%—were accompanied by gag orders of
indefinite duration.”64 Google reported a similar percentage.65 Apple asserted it re-
ceived approximately 590 unlimited or indefinite duration gag orders in the begin-
ning of 2016.66 LinkedIn asserts that it received hundreds of gag orders over the course
of the year ending in September 2016, with nearly two-thirds of them being of
indefinite duration.67 And, between April and June 2016, “nearly three-quarters (58
of 79) of all gag orders received by Snapchat under § 2705(b) had no definite end.”68
Microsoft argued that these gag orders violate Microsoft’s speech rights.69
Microsoft further claimed that the combination of no-notice search warrants and gag
orders violate its customers’ Fourth Amendment right to notice of a search.70 It
sought declaratory relief in response.71
In response to the government’s motion to dismiss, the district court allowed the
First Amendment claim to proceed, but dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims on
standing grounds.72 While acknowledging the “difficult situation” that the ruling
created, the district court judge, Judge Robart, deemed himself bound by Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent that precludes third parties from raising Fourth
Amendment claims.73 Judge Robart also rejected Microsoft’s argument that this case
presented “special circumstances” because the target might never learn of the search.74
63 Id.
64 Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com et al. in Support of Microsoft Corporation at 8,
Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv-
00538-JLR) [hereinafter Amazon Brief].
65 Id.
66 Brief of Amici Curiae Apple et al. in Support of Microsoft Corporation’s Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (No. 2:16-cv-00538-
JLR) [hereinafter Apple Brief].
67 Amazon Brief, supra note 64, at 7.
68 Id. at 8.
69 First Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at para. 1.
70 Id.
71 Id. at para. 41.
72 Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 910–16 (W.D. Wash.
2017).
73 Id. at 915–16.
74 Id. at 914–16. Judge Robart also earlier denied the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) the right to intervene in the case. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C16
-0538JLR, 2016 WL 4506808, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2016). At that time, Judge
Robart emphasized that, among other things, Microsoft was litigating the Fourth Amendment
claim on behalf of its customers. Id. The judge thus concluded that the ACLU’s interests were
not “sufficiently different” from Microsoft’s. Id. at *7; see also id. at *8 (emphasizing that the
ACLU “has not demonstrated that Microsoft is incapable or unwilling to make all available
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Instead, he concluded that the result was analogous to the situation faced by the
victim of an unreasonable search in a stranger’s home.75
Since then, the Department of Justice announced a new policy rule with respect
to gag orders—directing federal prosecutors to seek gag orders of no more than a
year and requiring federal prosecutors to conduct an “individualized and meaningful
assessment” as to whether there are sufficient grounds to request such gag orders
and to seek such orders only “when circumstances require.”76 Microsoft, in turn,
decided not to proceed with the case; according to Microsoft, the Department’s policy
has significantly improved, making continued litigation unnecessary.77 The case was
dismissed on October 25, 2017.78 Yet, even if federal prosecutors are now barred
from seeking indefinite gag orders, it is a practice that can be continued by the states.79
Thus, Judge Robart’s ruling—and reasoning—remains relevant.80 It relies on a restric-
tive interpretation of third party standing—a result that I argue undercuts key Fourth
Amendment protections.81
Importantly, there is a key difference between the situation addressed by the
Microsoft litigation and the situation identified by Judge Robart in which someone
is the target of an unreasonable search in a stranger’s home.82 In the latter case, a
stranger whose home was unlawfully searched can bring a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge.83 Of course, the stranger might not have any incentive to do so, but there is at
least a possible source for such a challenge.84 More importantly, the fact of the search
arguments in support of the objectives it holds in common with the ACLU”). But once Judge
Robart determined Microsoft lacked standing to raise the issue, this was no longer the case.
See Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 910–11. As a potential target of such secret searches, the
ACLU might have been able to raise the claims that Microsoft was unable to pursue. To be
sure, the ACLU would face its own standing issues, given its likely inability to prove that it
was a target of both a search and a gag order. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 804
F.3d 617, 626 (2d Cir. 2015) (declining to reach the First and Fourth Amendment consti-
tutional issues in the case because the harm to Appellants was in flux during the transitional
period of the Freedom Act). But once Microsoft’s claim was dismissed, the issues were suf-
ficiently different. If the ACLU could get around the separate standing issue, it would have
been able to raise the Fourth Amendment claim.
75 Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 916.
76 See Rosenstein Memorandum, supra note 20.
77 See Brad Smith, DOJ Acts to Curb the Overuse of Secrecy Orders. Now It’s Congress’
Turn., MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Oct. 23, 2017), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues
/2017/10/23/doj-acts-curb-overuse-secrecy-orders-now-congress-turn/ [https://perma.cc/B3JM
-2L6R].
78 Order Granting Microsoft Corporation’s Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal,
Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR (W.D. Wash. Oct. 24, 2017).
79 See Rosenstein Memorandum, supra note 20.
80 Microsoft, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 910–16.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 916.
83 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
84 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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would not be a secret. The stranger whose house was searched would learn of it and
could talk about it. Even if he or she did not know or convey the information to the
target, he could discuss it with friends, public interest groups, or the media. There
would thus be a mechanism for holding the government accountable, even if an
actual lawsuit was never filed.85
In the cases identified by Microsoft, by contrast, no one other than the service
provider may ever learn about the search.86 Unlike the stranger, the provider is
barred from telling anyone about the search.87 The result is, as Judge Stephen Smith
warned, a “regime of secrecy surrounding [SCA] court orders,”88 coupled with ex-
tremely limited opportunities for push back via court challenges.
2. The Facebook Litigation
In another case, Facebook sought to challenge the issuance of nearly 400 warrants
that Facebook argued were overbroad.89 Issued in conjunction with a disabilities fraud
case, the warrants sought virtually all communications, including all “undeleted or
saved photos,” “private messages,” and “chat history” of a cross-section of 381 indi-
viduals (including high school students) with virtually no date-range limitations.90
The warrants also were accompanied by no-notice orders.91
Facebook moved to quash, arguing that the breadth of the compulsion orders vio-
lated its customers’ Fourth Amendment rights.92 It also challenged the non-disclosure
orders.93 The New York Supreme Court (New York’s equivalent of a district court)
denied both challenges.94 As in the Microsoft case, the Supreme Court judge con-
cluded that Facebook lacked standing to bring the Fourth Amendment claim, since
it was Facebook’s customers—not Facebook—that had an expectation of privacy in
the sought-after data.95 The court also determined that disclosure would risk jeopar-
dizing the ongoing criminal investigation; as a result, the gag orders were valid.96
85 See supra notes 7–14 and accompanying text.
86 Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 915–16.
87 Id.
88 Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket,
6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 314 (2012) (examining secrecy resulting from a combination
of sealing and absence of notice associated with surveillance conducted pursuant to the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, of which the SCA is a part).
89 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141, 143 (N.Y. 2017).
90 Brief of Appellant at 12–15, In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 78
N.E.3d 141 (No. APL-2015-00318) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
91 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 25 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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Facebook appealed.97 While the appeal was pending, the government charged
62 of the 381 individuals whose data was targeted by the warrants, and Facebook
was ultimately permitted to notify the remaining 319.98 But Facebook continued to
pursue the claim—emphasizing that most of the targets lacked a “meaningful
remedy” and that, as the entity uniquely situated to challenge the orders, it should
be permitted to do so.99
Both the intermediate appellate court and New York’s highest court ruled against
Facebook.100 The intermediary appellate court concluded that “there is no constitu-
tional or statutory right to challenge an alleged defective warrant before it is executed,”
whether the challenge was brought by the direct target or third-party provider.101 It
thus sidestepped the third-party standing issue, deciding instead that, in contrast to
subpoenas, there was no right of pre-enforcement review, whether sought by the target
of the search or the provider served with the warrant.102 It described ex ante pro-
tections, in the form of approval of a warrant by a neutral judicial officer, and ex
post protections, in the form of a suppression remedy, as more than sufficient to
“successfully ensure that the government does not exceed its authority when re-
questing or executing a search warrant.”103
New York’s highest court upheld the ruling.104 It concluded that even if Facebook
could bring an initial motion to quash, there was no right to appeal the denial.105 In
doing so, it rejected Facebook’s argument that the SCA warrant in this case operated
97 Id.
98 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 15–16.
99 See id. at 30 (“It is inconceivable that the hundreds of targeted but non-indicted Facebook
users could all be expected to retain lawyers and file lawsuits against the Government chal-
lenging the bulk warrants. . . . As the recipient of the warrant, and the entity that actually
conducts the search, Facebook is uniquely positioned to help preserve privacy rights from
unjustified governmental intrusions.”).
100 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 14 N.Y.S.3d at 25; In re 381 Search
Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141, 143–44 (N.Y. 2017).
101 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 14 N.Y.S.3d at 25. The court
separately suggested, albeit without deciding, that, thanks to the third-party doctrine, the
relevant information might not even by protected by the Fourth Amendment at all. See id.
at 30.
102 Id. at 29. Facebook argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)—which authorizes a “court is-
suing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider,
[to] quash or modify such order, if the information or records requested are unusually volumi-
nous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on
such provider”—gave them a statutory right to object. In re 381 Search Warrant Directed
to Facebook, 14 N.Y.S.3d at 29. But the court read the provision as providing a statutory
right to object to subpoenas and court orders that fell short of a warrant. Id.
103 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 14 N.Y.S.3d at 26–27.
104 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 78 N.E.3d at 152–53.
105 Id. at 152.
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more like a subpoena than a warrant in the way it compelled a third party to produce
data.106 Under New York law, subpoenas are appealable; warrants are not.107
Only the dissenting judge reached the standing issue.108 The dissent examined
the factors laid out in the leading Supreme Court case on third-party standing, Powers
v. Ohio,109 and concluded that all were met.110 Facebook suffered an injury in terms
of the burden of complying with the warrant; Facebook had a sufficiently close rela-
tion to its customers to bring the claim; and the direct targets of the search were
hindered in their ability to raise the claim themselves.111 As the dissenting judge put it:
Even stipulating that each user would, despite the initial indefi-
nite gag order, be told at some point of the seizure, the mere formal
possibility of a civil suit does not foreclose Facebook from assert-
ing third-party standing as the litigant best placed to vindicate its
users’ rights in practice, before a violation of any rights has oc-
curred, by way of the adversarial system on which our rule of
law rests.112
The dissenting judge thus went a step further than what Microsoft sought in the
gag order case.113 In the gag order case, Microsoft emphasized the “special circum-
stances” that exist when the targets are indefinitely, and perhaps permanently, denied
the relevant information that would allow them to bring a Fourth Amendment claim.114
The dissent in the Facebook case concluded that even if targets are ultimately noti-
fied about the search, they are not likely to be able to vindicate their claims;115 thus,
the relevant third-party provider on whom the warrant has been served should be
permitted to do so.116
106 Id. at 146.
107 Id. at 145–46. This is an interesting contrast with the position taken by the government
in the Microsoft Ireland case. In that case, the government argued that the warrants should be
treated like subpoenas for purposes of assessing territoriality. See, e.g., In re Warrant to
Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by the Microsoft Corp., 15 F.
Supp. 3d 466, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
108 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 78 N.E.3d at 170–73 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
109 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1991).
110 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 78 N.E.3d at 172 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
111 See id.
112 Id. at 173.
113 See id.; Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 912–16 (W.D.
Wash. 2017).
114 Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 912–13.
115 In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, 78 N.E.3d at 172–73 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
116 Id. at 171–72.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BACKDROP
A. Notice as a Fourth Amendment Requirement
In several contexts, the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of ex ante
notice as a means of protecting property, reducing the likelihood of violence, and
preserving dignity.117 The requirement that police officers knock and announce their
presence before entering one’s home is designed to give individuals an opportunity
to “prepare themselves” for the entry of the police, thus preserving their dignity, while
at the same time minimizing the risk of property destruction and likelihood of violent
escalation.118
Even if the search does not involve direct police to citizen interaction, ex post
notification—perhaps delayed—is still required pursuant to both the Constitution
and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.119 In Berger v. New York,120
for example, the Supreme Court struck down a surveillance scheme that, among other
problems, did not require notice to the government’s targets.121 A decade later, the
Court in United States v. Donovan122 described notice as essential to the constitu-
tionality of the Wiretap Act.123 And in Dalia v. United States,124 the Supreme Court
again emphasized the importance of notice.125 In concluding that the delayed notifi-
cation provisions of the Wiretap Act provided a constitutionally adequate substitute
for advance notice, the Court made clear that while notice could be delayed, it could
not be abandoned altogether.126 While not a constitutional provision, Rule 41 stems
from an understanding of what the Constitution and good policy requires, mandating
117 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (discussing how an announced
entry—as opposed to an unannounced entry—better protects the owner’s property and privacy).
118 Id. (citation omitted).
119 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1).
120 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
121 Id. at 60 (emphasizing that the statute “has no requirement for notice as do conven-
tional warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some showing of special facts”);
see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967) (emphasizing that a critical compo-
nent of a conventional warrant is that it “ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended
search”); United States v. Freitas (Freitas I), 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding
that “the absence of any notice requirement in the warrant casts strong doubt on its constitu-
tional adequacy”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 803 (1994) (describing notice as essential element of what makes warrants reasonable).
122 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
123 Id. at 429 n.19; id. at 430 (citing with approval Senator Hart’s determination that “notice
of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any surveillance statute” (citation omitted)).
124 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
125 Id. at 247–48 (discussing notice requirements in previous cases).
126 See id. The array of knock-and-announce cases also emphasize the importance of notice,
but, for slightly different reasons, focuses more on concerns about unnecessary police violence
and destruction of property.
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that law enforcement officials leave an inventory of property seized, thereby ensur-
ing that the target knows what was taken and has an opportunity to reclaim it.127
Berger,128 Donovan,129 and Dalia130 make clear that while protection of property
and risk of escalating violence provide relevant justifications for a notice require-
ment, they are not the only justifications. In this trio of cases, there is no deprivation
of property.131 The phones or other devices used to communicate are not taken away
or otherwise interfered with.132 The participants can continue to engage in their on-
going communications, albeit with an extra set of ears.133 And there is no direct police
to citizen encounter that risks violent escalation.134 Yet, these cases make clear that
such forms of surveillance still require some form of notice, albeit ex post.135 There
are at least four reasons why this would be the case—and that this is the right result.
First, the risk of abuse. Notice is necessary to ensure citizens have the relevant
information to respond to and protect themselves from abuse or overreach.136 With-
out notice individuals will have no basis to object or push back against excessive
surveillance.137
Second, the importance of trust. The Supreme Court has recognized this in
connection with the issuance of ordinary warrants—describing the issuance of such
warrants as assuring the citizen of the “lawful authority of the executing officer, his
need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”138 Notice provisions do the
same—assuring the citizen that the government is acting according to lawful
authority and subject to required limits.139
Third, the protection of expressive freedom. When people fear they are being
watched, their freedom is put at risk.140 If the fear of secret surveillance is suffi-
ciently strong or widespread, individuals will be less willing to experiment or ex-
press unpopular or unconventional ideas.141 Notice requirements help minimize
127 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B)–(C).
128 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
129 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
130 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
131 See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 241–42; Donovan, 429 U.S. at 418; Berger, 388 U.S. at 44–45.
132 See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 241–42; Donovan, 429 U.S. at 418; Berger, 388 U.S. at 44–45.
133 See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 241–42; Donovan, 429 U.S. at 418; Berger, 388 U.S. at 44–45.
134 Cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (discussing the potential danger of
physical harm during a search).
135 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f).
136 See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 (“[L]egislative history indicates that postintercept notice
was designed instead to assure the community that the wiretap technique is reasonably
employed.”).
137 See id.
138 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
139 See id.
140 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (warn-
ing that governmental surveillance “chills associational and expressive freedoms”).
141 See id.
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unfounded fears of surveillance by bringing out what kind of surveillance is being
conducted into the open and minimizing the fear of unwatched watching.142
Fourth, the protection of democratic processes. Without transparency about what
the government is doing in the name of security, there is no way for citizens to
weigh in.143 Without notice, and thus knowledge of governmental action, there is no
way to assess whether the actions are something to support or whether to push for
change.144 Transparency—and hence notice requirements—is essential to meaning-
ful democratic accountability.145
Yet, despite these potent concerns, no-notice warrants have consistently been
issued pursuant to the SCA, often coupled with gag orders.146 One possible explana-
tion is the blithe application of the third party doctrine, pursuant to which there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in certain information transmitted to a third-party
service provider.147 According to this view, there is no Fourth Amendment concern
at all.148 But in light of Warshak,149 this rationale fails with respect to the no-notice
searches of emails;150 Warshak, after all, concluded that emails are deemed protected
by the Fourth Amendment, even though they are in the hands of a third party.151
Alternatively, courts have recognized that individuals retain a Fourth Amend-
ment interest in at least some data (such as emails) held by third-party providers, but
have concluded that notice to the third party is sufficient to meet the Fourth Amend-
ment’s requirements.152 This, after all, is what Judge Robart relied on in comparing
142 See id.
143 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 896–98 (2006)
(“[C]ontemporary political theorists place the publicity of government laws and actions at
the core of democracy because it enables both the rational choice of the individual citizen
and the full flowering of informed public debate by the collective.”).
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See, e.g., In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained
by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re 381 Search Warrants Directed
to Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141 (N.Y. 2017). But see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena for
[Redacted]@yahoo.com, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
147 See, e.g., United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1245 (D.N.M. 2013) (“[T]here
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in otherwise private information disclosed to a third
party.”).
148 See, e.g., In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Or. 2009) (“Much of the
reluctance to apply traditional notions of third party disclosure to the e-mail context seems
to stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of the lack of privacy we all have in our e-mails.
Some people seem to think that they are as private as letters, phone calls, or journal entries.
The blunt fact is, they are not.”).
149 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
150 Id. at 274.
151 See id.
152 See Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 916 (W.D. Wash.
2017); In re Grand Jury Subpoena for [Redacted]@yahoo.com, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1093–95
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the situation presented by Microsoft in the gag order case to a warrant served on a
stranger.153 And other courts have reached analogous conclusions in this and other
contexts.154 If the government serves a warrant on FedEx for a particular package,
for example, it need not separately notify the owner of that package.155
But there is a difference in kind between third-party search cases employing
ordinary Rule 41 warrants and those searches carried out pursuant to the SCA.156 In
the “ordinary” cases, the stranger is permitted to publicize the fact of the search.157
Similarly, FedEx is permitted to tell its customer—or anyone else.158
The SCA provisions are different because of the combination of the no-notice
warrant and the gag order provisions.159 There may, of course, be times in which the
practical result is the same in both situations—if, for example, there is a search of
a package sent via FedEx, no subsequent prosecution, and FedEx never informs its
customer or otherwise publicizes the search. But, there is also an important differ-
ence. Concerned customers could demand notice. They could only contract with
mailing services that commit to provide notice of governmental searches. In the SCA
context, however, that is not possible. The provider may be precluded from giving
notice.160 It thus cannot contract with its customers to do something that U.S. law
prohibits it from doing.161
(N.D. Cal. 2015). Carpenter v. United States, heard by the Supreme Court in November
2017, may further limit reliance on third-party doctrine as a basis for dismissing such Fourth
Amendment concerns, at least as it applies to the collection of location information. 819 F.3d
880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402). For critiques
of the third party doctrine, see, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611 (2015); Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project,
94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1117–19 (2006) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004)); Patricia L. Bellia & Susan
Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121,
147–58; Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 40–44 (2011).
153 Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 916.
154 See, e.g., United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 662–63 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that
when property is in the hands of a third party, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
quire notice to that third party and nothing more); United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59,
83 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“There is no separate requirement that the officer provide the warrant,
a receipt, or any other form of notice to the owner of the property.” (quoting In re United States,
665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. Or. 2009))); United States v. Henshaw, No. 15-00339-01-CR
-W-BP, 2017 WL 1148469, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2017).
155 See, e.g., United States v. Zacher, 465 F.3d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 2006).
156 Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, with 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
157 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1093.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 1093–95.
160 See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
161 See id.
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There is also a difference in degree. The scope and scale of information now in the
hands of third parties is vast.162 Third-party providers—at the behest of the govern-
ment—can access that information with relative ease.163 Police do not themselves have
to go to a home, put themselves at risk, or track a target.164 The quantity of searches is
in no way limited by the number of available police officers.165 As Justice Alito put it,
“[i]n the precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitu-
tional nor statutory, but practical.”166 In the digital age, the resource limitations that
apply to searches and seizures of people and other tangible things are in many cases
lifted, or at least greatly reduced.167 Thus, the quantity of no-notice searches is expo-
nentially greater than any comparable search or seizure of analogous tangible thing.168
Put simply, the simple analogies to the search of the stranger’s home or of a
package in FedEx’s control fail to tell the full story or account for the full range of
interests at stake.169 The scale and scope of searches of digital evidence is likely much
greater than comparable searches of their tangible counterparts.170 There is as a re-
sult also a greater likelihood of searches with neither ex ante nor ex post notice by
the government to the target.171 The reasoning of Berger,172 Donovan,173 and Dalia174
all highlight the resulting constitutional concerns.
B. Standing
The absence of notice to the target in these SCA warrant cases makes the third-
party standing issue particularly acute.175 As previously described, the combination
162 See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 295 (6th Cir. 2010).
163 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 Id.; see Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004) (emphasizing that “[p]ractical
considerations—namely, limited police resources and community hostility to related traffic
tieups—seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation” of sobriety checkpoints); see also Neil
Richards, Secret Government Searches and Digital Civil Liberties, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/digital-privacy/secret-searches-and-seizures-and-digital-civil
-liberties#footnote-ref-22 [https://perma.cc/VQ5J-3FQP] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
167 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
168 See id.
169 Notably, I am not alone in raising these concerns. See, e.g., Stephanie K. Pell &
Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward Reasonable Standards for Law
Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH L.J.
117, 185–88 (2012); Smith, supra note 88; see also Richards, supra note 152, at 1125.
170 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
171 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 916 (W.D.
Wash. 2017).
172 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
173 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
174 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
175 See Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 897.
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of no-notice provisions and restrictive third-party standing rules means that there
will be no one who can raise a Fourth Amendment claim, in at least some non-
negligible set of cases, for some potentially extended period of time.176 Contrary to
Judge Robart’s decision in the Microsoft case, this seems like exactly the kind of
special circumstance that should justify third-party provider standing in these cases—
particularly given that in several situations presented to Judge Robart, no-notice
warrants were coupled with gag orders of indefinite duration.177 In fact, a brief exami-
nation of the key Supreme Court cases that Judge Robart relied on suggests that they
are not as limiting as Judge Robart assumed (although to be fair, Judge Robart was
also hemmed in by a series of Ninth Circuit precedent that are beyond the scope of
what I address here).178
In Alderman v. United States,179 the Court reaffirmed the idea that Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights that cannot be “vicariously asserted.”180 But
the ruling arose in the context of an assertion of the exclusionary rule and seemed
to turn in part on the fact that there was someone who could challenge the search,
even if the defendant in the criminal case could not.181 The Court explicitly empha-
sized that the actual “victim can and very probably will object for himself when and
if it becomes important for him to do so.”182 Similarly, in Rakas v. Illinois,183 the
Court made clear that only individuals whose reasonable expectation of privacy has
been violated can seek to exclude evidence based on a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion.184 But there, too, the Rakas Court emphasized that “[t]here is no reason to think
that a party whose rights have been infringed will not, if evidence is used against
him, have ample motivation . . . to suppress it.”185
In other contexts in which the Court has stated that entities cannot bring Fourth
Amendment claims, the actual target of the relevant government action is on notice
and thus has an opportunity to object. In California Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz,186 for
example, the Supreme Court cursorily rejected a bank’s authority to vicariously assert
the Fourth Amendment claims of depositors engaged in the kind of $10,000 domes-
tic currency transactions that triggered the relevant reporting requirements.187 But
depositors who fell in this category presumably could have raised concerns.188 The
176 See id. at 916.
177 Id. at 912–16.
178 See id.
179 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
180 Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
181 See id. at 171–86.
182 Id. at 174.
183 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
184 Id. at 143–49.
185 Id. at 134 (citing Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174).
186 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
187 Id. at 67–68.
188 See id.
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situation presented by the Microsoft litigation189 was quite different. In that case,
the persons whose Fourth Amendment rights were implicated—what the Alderman
court calls the “victim”190—has no ability to raise the claims because they were not,
and cannot be, told of the search.191 Given the issuance of indefinite no-notice orders,
they might never be told of the search.192
In such situations, Microsoft’s contention that there are “special circumstances”
seems correct.193 After all, the Supreme Court, albeit in contexts that do not involve
the Fourth Amendment, has recognized the need to relax standing rules in analogous
situations. In NAACP v. Alabama,194 for example, the Court permitted the NAACP
to bring a due process claim on behalf of its members; the Court emphasized that it
was dealing with a situation in which the “constitutional rights of persons who are
not immediately before the Court could not be effectively vindicated except through
an appropriate representative.”195 Similarly, in Barrows v. Jackson,196 the Supreme
Court concluded that standing rules should be relaxed in an equal protection case
when there is a risk that state action could yield a denial of constitutional rights and
“it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to
present their grievance before any court.”197 To be sure, these cases did not involve
Fourth Amendment claims, but the principle is analogous whether one is discussing
Fourth or First Amendment rights.198 Those directly implicated by government action
may not be in a position to challenge it; in those cases, third-party adjudication may
be the only—or best—mechanism for certain grievances to be heard, and thus key
constitutional rights adequately protected.199
Microsoft thus seems correct in its application of the factors laid out in Powers
v. Ohio,200 the leading case on third-party standing. As the Powers Court concluded,
third-party standing may be appropriate when the following three factors are met:
(1) the litigant experienced an “injury in fact,” therefore providing him or her with
a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the dispute;201 (2) the litigant has
189 Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
190 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174; supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
191 See Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 916; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133
(1978) (reaffirming that Fourth Amendment rights may not be asserted vicariously).
192 See Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 916.
193 See Microsoft’s Supplemental Brief on Motion to Dismiss in Response to Court’s
Minute Order at 1, Microsoft, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR).
194 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
195 Id. at 459.
196 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
197 Id. at 257.
198 See generally NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Barrows, 346 U.S. 249.
199 See generally NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Barrows, 346 U.S. 249.
200 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
201 Id. at 411 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976)).
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a “close relation to the third party;”202 and (3) there is “some hindrance to the third
party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.”203
In cases involving no-notice search warrants coupled with gag orders of indefi-
nite duration, the third factor is clearly met. The third party cannot protect his or her
own interests if he or she lacks any knowledge of the search and seizure. This is a
particular concern in cases involving indefinite gag orders. But even in cases where
the target is eventually told, however, the delay period can be prolonged. The Depart-
ment of Justice, for example, talks about gag orders of “only” a year.204 But during
that year, the government may collect, and perhaps disseminate, a significant amount
of information about a target. That information can be used in support of a whole
host of additional investigative measures or civil sanctions, even if it does not ever
yield criminal sanctions. Moreover, that year-long delay period can be renewed.205
During that time period, there is a clear hindrance in the target’s ability to assert his
or her rights—with potential consequences for the affected target.
In most circumstances, the first and second factors are also met. A third-party
provider presumably suffers some injury—in the form of lost time and resources—
in carrying out the search. To the extent that the provider complies in a way that
undermines, or is perceived as undermining, its customers’ interests, it can have a
broader economic cost in terms of lost business. And as the entity entrusted to manage
individuals’ most personal communications, the provider also arguably has a suf-
ficiently close relationship with its customers to bring a claim on their behalf.
Put another way, it seems that the Supreme Court case law is not nearly as clear-cut
as it has been portrayed. After all, no Supreme Court case explicitly precludes courts
from permitting third-party assertions of Fourth Amendment rights in those limited
situations where the Powers factors are met.206 It seems that if the target is denied
any information about the search, providers should be permitted to raise relevant
Fourth Amendment concerns in the targets’ stead.
C. Ex Ante or Ex Post Challenges
There is, however, a key question as to the timing of a permitted challenge.
After all, most of the case law seems to suggest that ex post challenges to warrants
should be permitted, but that ex ante notice of searches and seizures—and thus
challenges—can be delayed.207 Moreover, the kind of destruction of property and
escalation of violence concerns that support the need for ex ante notice simply do
202 Id. (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113–14).
203 Id. (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115–16).
204 See Rosenstein Memorandum, supra note 20.
205 See id.
206 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411.
207 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena for [Redacted]@yahoo.com, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1091,
1093–95 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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not apply when the government is asking a third-party provider to access data on its
behalf.208 Yet, the kind of challenges both Facebook and Microsoft are seeking come
in the form of an ex ante check: a motion to quash the warrant.209
There is both precedent and good reason for permitting such ex ante challenges.
These kinds of search warrants are in key respects analogous to subpoenas.210 They
do not involve a direct police search of a person or place.211 Rather, they—like a
subpoena—compel a company to produce information in its custody or control.212
To be sure, the government must satisfy the higher substantive standard of a finding
of probable cause; but this does not change the fact that the warrant operates, like
a subpoena, as a form of compelled disclosure.213 As a general matter, a company
being subpoenaed for records can file a motion to quash.214 Providers served with
a warrant should be permitted to do so as well, particularly in those situations when
their customers are not provided notice of the search. And perhaps—as the dissent-
ing judge in the Facebook case persuasively argued215—in all contexts. This is the
case for at least four reasons.
First, providers are often “best placed” to safeguard the rights at issue.216 They
are likely to be better equipped to understand the relevant issues and better equipped
to raise challenges if and when there is a violation of the target’s rights.
Second, the risk of proliferation and dissemination of collected data highlights
the importance of ex ante review—protecting against the collection before it even
takes place.
Third, it makes logical sense to allow for ex ante challenges in this context. It
is, after all, not clear at what point ex parte (versus ex ante) review would occur. The
obvious choice would be at the point in time of target notice. At that point, the target
could specify whether or not he or she wished the provider to pursue a claim on his
or her behalf. But the extended period of secrecy—even with a default maximum of
one year absent renewal217—highlights the need for some sort of effective, advance
checking, prior to target notice.
208 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (discussing potential violence and
destruction that might accompany a search).
209 See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re 381 Search Warrants
Directed to Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141, 143 (N.Y. 2017).
210 See In re Warrant to Search, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471.
211 See id.
212 Id. at 469.
213 See id. at 470.
214 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3).
215 See In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 78 N.E.3d 141, 159–63
(N.Y. 2017) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
216 See id. at 173.
217 See Rosenstein Memorandum, supra note 20.
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Fourth, the sensitivity of the information—as indicated by the obligation to get
a warrant—heightens, not diminishes, the importance of such pre-enforcement
challenges.
III. A STATUTORY FIX
The doctrine can and should evolve to reflect the concerns raised by the combi-
nation of no-notice warrants, gag orders, and a restrictive interpretation of third-
party standing rules. But doctrinal changes are slow. Rather than wait for the needed
evolution of the case law, these issues can—and should—be resolved via amendments
to the SCA. Here, I suggest three:
First, require notice in connection with the issuance of warrants for content.
Under the current statute, notice is required when the government obtains content
via a court order that falls short of the warrant requirement and when it obtains
content via a subpoena; it need not provide notice when it obtains data via a war-
rant.218 This distinction cannot be supported, given the importance of notice to
vindicating the interests that the Fourth Amendment is meant to protect.219
Specifically, the statute should be updated to require notice in connection with
the issuance of warrants. The delayed notice provisions should also apply, permit-
ting the government to delay notice in cases where such notice would impede the
investigation or otherwise cause an “adverse result,” as that term has been defined
in the statute.220
Second, the SCA should be amended to include time limits on gag orders that
match the time limits associated with the delayed notice orders. Delayed notice
orders issued in conjunction with § 2703(d) orders and subpoenas can be granted for
renewable periods of ninety days.221 The gag order provisions should track those
requirements—and any such delayed notice provisions implemented in connection
with warrants. There is in fact no legitimate justification for a gag order that persists
longer than a delayed notification order.
Third, providers should be given explicit authorization to raise Fourth Amendment
claims and other challenges based on the burden imposed by the full range of orders
to disclose, including subpoena, court order, and warrant. Providers are often the best,
if not the only, party situated to assess the legitimacy of the government’s actions
and push back on requests that are overly broad or arguably unconstitutional.222
218 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2012). As discussed previously, however, the government has,
since the Sixth Circuit ruling in Warshak, adopted a practice which always obtains a warrant
when it is seeking content for purposes of a criminal investigation. See supra notes 32–36
and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 916 (W.D.
Wash. 2017).
220 See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(B)(2) (2012).
221 Id. § 2705(a)(1)(B)(4).
222 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 30.
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Given the increasingly important role these intermediaries play in managing our data
and responding to disclosure demands from law enforcement officials, they should
be permitted to bring claims on their customers’ behalf. This does not mean that they
always will—or should—either bring a challenge or win. Whether or not the warrant
or any other compulsory order will be enforced ultimately will—and should—be
decided by a judge.
The statute also should be written in a way that ensures the government can
access critical information as any such challenge proceeds. Specifically, the provider
should be obliged to produce the information if it loses its initial motion to quash.
If the provider wins on appeal, then the government should be precluded from using
the information that has been obtained in any criminal case.
CONCLUSION
The rise of digitized communications is not only changing the ways in which
the citizenry interacts with one another, but also changing the interactions between
citizens and the police. Increasingly, law enforcement officials are seeking data from
third-party providers, without the knowledge of or any notice to the target of the
search and seizure. Meanwhile, providers are precluded from bringing Fourth
Amendment challenges to these searches and seizures, even in situations in which
they are the only ones with knowledge of what the government is doing. This kind
of secret searching creates the risk of abuse and overreach, threatens to erode trust
in law enforcement, and eliminates the kind of transparency that is essential to the
effective functioning of a democracy.
